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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Environmental Law - Kleppe v. Sierra Club: Addressing the
Question of Programmatic Impact Statements
Section 102(2)(C)l of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA)2 requires federal' officials to prepare an environmental
impact statement (EIS) for "every recommendation or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment."'4  Because of the in-
evitable conflict between the broad language of the Act' and existing
agency decisional procedures, a constant stream of litigation concerning
the required scope of an EIS has followed NEPA's enactment. One
of the questions that has arisen from agency conflict has been: if, within
a given region, a federal agency is involved in related projects for which
individual impact statements have already been prepared, does NEPA
require the agency to prepare a regional (programmatic)" impact state-
ment as well? Reversing a District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision, 7 the United States Supreme Court, in Kleppe v. Sierra
Club," held that the Department of the Interior was not required by
NEPA to prepare a regional EIS for the Northern Great Plains region
where the Department was leasing coal mines for development.
The Northern Great Plains region, a rich coal basin covering
portions of Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota,9 is
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
3. Id. § 4332(2)(D) (Supp. V 1975), added by the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424, allows, under certain
conditions, a state agency or official to prepare an impact statement.
4. Id. § 4332(2) (C).
5. The scope of federal activity to be covered by an EIS is broad because of
NEPA's requirements that the federal government "improve and coordinate Federal
plans, functions, programs, and resources ... to attain the widest range of beneficial
uses of the environment without degradation . . . ." id. § 4331(b)(3); "utilize a sys-
tematic, interdisciplinary approach," id. § 4332(2)(A); develop alternatives to recom-
mended projects, id. § 4332(2) (E);,and "recognize the worldwide and long-range char-
acter of environmental problems," id. § 4332(2) (F).
6. In this Note, the phrases "programmatic EIS" and "comprehensive EIS" will be
used synonymously with "regional EIS." The first two phrases, however, are not always
synonymous with "regional" since programs involve several projects that may extend be-
yond a given region. In Kleppe, the phrases were synonymous since all the projects were
within the same region.
7. Sierra: Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
8. 96 S. Ct. 2718 (1976).
9. According to the Brief for Petitioners at 4 n.2, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S.
Ct. 2718 (1976), the Department of the Interior has divided the Nation's coal lands into
six provinces, one of which is the Northern Great Plains province. The Department
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owned to a large extent by the United States government. Under the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920,10 the Secretary Of the Interior
(Secretary) is authorized to divide and lease for development any coal
lands owned by the federal government.11 In 1972, the Department
of the Interior (Department) undertook the Northern Great Plains
Resources Program (NGPRP), a federal-state, interagency study
12
devoted entirely to environmental concerns of the region.13 Further,
in 1973, the Secretary announced a complete review of the De-
partment's national coal leasing program, which was designed "to study
the environmental impact of the Department's entire range of coal
related activities and to develop a planning system to guide the national
leasing program.'
4
In July 1973, Sierra and other environmental groups brought suit
against the Secretary, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
further coal development within the region'5 pending preparation of
defines that province as including the Dakotas, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Nebraska
and Colorado.
10. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970).
11. Id. § 201(a).
12. The court of appeals noted that the Secretary of the Interior had shown con-
cern over NEPA's effect on development of the Northern Great Plains province and had
recognized that NEPA might require comprehensive development of the province and
a more comprehensive environmental impact analysis than would be allowed by impact
statements for individual mines. The court attributed the NGPRP and an earlier study,
the North Central Power Study of 1970, to this recognition on the part of the Secretary.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 862-63 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
13. 96 S. Ct. at 2724. The court of appeals described the purpose of the NGPRP
as follows: "to assess the potential social, economic, and environmental impacts that
development of the Province would cause." 514 F.2d at 863.
14. 96 S. Ct. at 2725. The study resulted in a "Coal Programmatic EIS" that was
finalized in September 1975. From the study came a proposed leasing program based
on the Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation System and an evaluation of the pos-
sible environmental impact of the national program as well as alternatives to the pro-
gram. While the study was being conducted, the Secretary put into effect a "short term
leasing policy" to restrict new leasing during the review. Id. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals later found large loopholes in the restrictions imposed upon
development of the province allowing federal activity to proceed:
(1) mhe short-term leasing program applies only to new leases and does
not interfere with the Department's ability to approve mining plans for pre-
existing leases in the area; (2) some leases may be issued under the short-
term leasing policy itself; and (3) federal activity in the Province is not really
suspended pending issuance of the NGPRP, but rather can continue upon ap-
proval of the Under Secretary.
514 F.2d at 864-65. In fact, between the time restrictions were imposed in February
1973 and the June 1975 decision of the court of appeals, at least four mining plans were
approved and approval of four more mines in the Eastern Powder River Coal Basin was
pending. Id. at 865.
15. For a discussion of the activity in the province, see 514 F.2d at 864-66.
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a regional EIS.'6  The district court found no regional federal action
within the meaning of NEPA and held that a regional impact state-
ment is not necessary for individual projects related only by geography.
After oral argument on appeal by Sierra Club, 17 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit granted a motion for a limited
injunction pending its decision: the Secretary was ordered to take no
further action regarding mining plans and railroad rights-of-way in the
Eastern Powder River Coal Basin. 8 Thereafter, the court of appeals
reversed and remanded, 19 concluding that
when the federal government, through exercise of its power to
approve leases, mining plans, rights-of-way, and water option con-
tracts, attempts to "control development" of a definite region, it
is engaged in a regional program constituting major federal action
within the meaning of NEPA, whether it labels its attempts a
"plan," a "program," or nothing at all. 20
The court of appeals believed that a comprehensive major federal
action was "contemplated" in the Northern Great Plains; therefore, a
balancing of four factors2' used in an earlier decision 22 would be neces-
sary to determine the time during the program when the EIS would
be required.23 The temporary injunction was continued,24 however,
to allow the Department to determine its future role in the region and,
16. Jurisdiction was asserted under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. §§
1331(a) & 1361 (1970).
17. The district court had found that the region identified by Sierra Club was not
"'an entity, region or area which has been defined by the Federal Government by statute
or executive action' for purposes of any Federal program, project, or action." 514 F.2d
at 867. It had further concluded that "'[there is no existing or proposed Federal re-
gional program, plan, project, or other regional "federal action" within the meaning of
NEPA Section 102(2) for the development of coal or other resources' in the Northern
Great Plains region." Id. Having so determined, the court held that "in the absence
of regional federal action, multiple applications for individual federal action in connec-
tion with individual private projects which are unrelated to one another except geograph-
ically do not either constitute regional federal action or mandate a regional impact state-
ment." Id.
18. Id. at 868.
19. Id. at 884.
20. Id. at 878.
21. The four factors were: (1) How likely and how soon is the program to come
to fruition? (2) To what extent is valid information now available on the effects of
implementation of the program and of alternatives? (3) To what extent are irretriev-
able commitments being made and options being precluded as the proposal progresses?
(4) How severe will the environmental effects of program implementation be? Id. at
880.
22. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. (SIPI) v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
23. 514 F.2d at 880.
24. Id. at 883.
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based upon that role, to determine whether an impact statement was
necessary.
25
In early 1976, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction and
granted the Secretary's petition for certiorari. 2  Noting that the Secre-
tary agreed that NEPA section 102(2) (C) required both individual
impact statements for the single leases involved and a Coal Program-
matic EIS to accompany the new national leasing program,2 7 the Court
agreed with the Secretary: NEPA did not require the Secretary to pre-
pare an EIS on the entire Northern Great Plains region because there
had been no report or recommendation on a proposal for major federal
action with respect to that region.28 In addition, the Court specifically
agreed with the district court that the NGPRP was not a recommen-
dation or report on a proposal for major federal action and, hence, did
not fall within NEPA's section 102(2) (C).29
In response to the court of appeals' opinion, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Secretary had not contemplated a regional plan or
proposal3 and that, even if he had contemplated such a plan, NEPA
does not require an impact statement prior to "the time at which it
makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action. 3 1
According to the Court NEPA requires no balancing test such as was
promulgated by the court of appeals.32 Before the Supreme Court, the
Sierra Club contended 33 that a regional impact statement is required
25. The court of appeals was unable, due to an incomplete record, to conclude an
analysis of the four balancing factors; it therefore remanded to allow the Department
to complete the NGPRP. Based on the NGPRP, the Department was to determine its
role in the region and the necessity for a programmatic EIS. Id. at 882.
26. 96 S. Ct. at 2714. The Court noted that shortly after the injunction was
stayed, the Secretary approved the four mining plans in the East Powder River Coal
Basin. Id.
27. Id. at 2726.
28. Id. at 2726-27.
29. Id. at 2726. The Court, relying on a statement by the Secretary, found irrel-
evant, for purposes of a regional EIS, the NGPRP. Such a study, according to the Sec-
retary, is a "prelude to informed agency planning and provide[s] the data base on which
the Department may decide to take specific actions for which impact statements are pre-
pared." Id. at 2731.
30. Id. at 2727.
31. Id. at 2728 (quoting Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320
(1975) (SCRAP II)).
32. Id. at 2729.
33. Sierra Club had decided not to support the court of appeals' decision for ob-
vious reasons: SCRAP 1I, 422 U.S. 289 (1975), and Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d
856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), were both decided in June 1975. SCRAP II essentially silenced
the court of appeals' opinion since it clearly held that an EIS is necessary only at the
time an agency makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for major federal ac-
tion. After that, by order of the Supreme Court the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
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on all coal-related projects in the region "because they are intimately
related. '34  The Court considered this argument susceptible of two
interpretations. 35 The first interpretation imposed upon Sierra's con-
tention was that the individual impact statements were inadequate.
The Court refused to consider this interpretation since the case was not
brought as a challenge to a particular EIS and there was no EIS in the
record. Second, the Court considered that Sierra's contention could be
interpreted as an attack on the Secretary's decision not to prepare one
regional EIS. The Court agreed with this second view that section
102(2)(C) may require a comprehensive EIS in limited situations in
which several proposed actions are pending at the same time; the de-
cision to prepare a comprehensive EIS, however, was considered to
be one for the agency. Accordingly, the Court refused to reverse the
agency's decision unless it could be shown to be arbitrary and capric-
ious.3 6 In Kleppe, the Court found nothing arbitrary in the Secretary's
decision not to prepare a regional EIS;17 therefore, in a seven-two
split, 8 the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision.
The first involvement of the Supreme Court in the chain of cases
leading to Kleppe was Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad v. SCRAP
(SCRAP 1I).11 There the Court answered, at least superficially, the
question of when, in the life of a project, a final EIS is required. The
Court interpreted section 102(2)(C) literally: an agency must pre-
pare the final EIS at the "time at which it makes a recommendation
or report on a proposal for federal action. 4 9 Subsequently the SCRAP
1I analysis was applied to a programmatic impact statement case in
in Conservation Soe'y, Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976) (per
curiam), was required to apply SCRAP 11 to a highway segmentation case. The court
found that, since there was no comprehensive program, no comprehensive EIS was re-
quired. The Sierra Club, therefore, relied upon another argument made before the court
of appeals but not reached by that court.
34. 96 S. Ct. at 2730.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2731.
37. Id.
38. Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joined, concurred in part and dis-
sented in part. His disagreement with the majority was based on his belief that although
a final EIS is due at the time at which an agency makes a recommendation or report
on a program for federal action, preparation of that statement must be commenced early
in the process. Id. at 2734. This approach is necessary, Marshall reasoned, to comply
with the mandate of NEPA that early consideration of environmental consequences be
made possible through production of the EIS. Id. Marshall found that the test devised
by the Second Circuit was an effective remedy. Id. at 2735.
39. 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
40. Id. at 320.
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Conservation Society, Inc. v. Secretary of Transportation.4 The district
court42 had required a comprehensive impact statement for an entire
highway despite the absence of a federal plan for the entire route, be-
cause it found that the three states through which the highway passed
were looking toward development of the entire corridor into a super-
highway. 3 On the basis of SCRAP 1141 the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, and on remand the Second Circuit held that a compre-
hensive EIS could not be required since there was "no overall federal
plan.
45
The purpose of an environmental impact statement is "to aid in
the agencies' own decision making process and to advise other inter-
ested agencies and the public of the environmental consequences of
planned federal action. 46 The initial determination to prepare an en-
vironmental impact statement, the so-called threshold decision, rests
with the agency responsible for the federal action. NEPA requires
that impact statements be prepared for major federal actions "signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment."47  Before
Kleppe, the standard of judicial review of threshold determinations had
varied among the federal courts.4 8  The majority of courts had adopted
41. 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded sub nom. Coleman v.
Conservation Soc'y, Inc., 423 U.S. 809 (1975), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Conservation
Soc'y, Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976).
42. Conservation Soc'y, Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt.
1973).
43. Id. at 636.
44. The Court also reversed in light of the National Environmental Policy Act
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D)
(Supp. V 1975), which allows state agencies and officers, under certain conditions, to
prepare an EIS).
45. Based on SCRAP I1 and Conservation Society, the result in Kleppe comes as
no surprise. In fact, those two opinions appear to render the Kleppe opinion unneces-
sary. A closer consideration of Kleppe, however, yields two reasons for which the Court
decided the case. First, on the issue of timing, the Court rejected specifically the four
factor balancing test first promulgated by the District of Columbia Circuit in 1973 and
revived by the same lower court in this case. Second, -on the issue of the scope of an
EIS, the Court provided some guidance as to the circumstances under which a program-
matic EIS will be necessary even in the absence of a proposal. This Note will focus
only on the latter issue and will analyze the Court's treatment of programmatic impact
statements.
46. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F.
Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806
(E.D. Tenn. 1972).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970).
48. For discussions of judicial review of agency determinations, see Anderson,
The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 356-
62 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974); Comment, Environmental Law: Judicial Re-
view of Federal Agency Actions under NEPA, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 866 (1975).
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an extremely lenient standard: an agency's decision would not be over-
turned unless deemed arbitrary and capricious. Other courts had re-
quired that an agency's threshold determination be reasonable-an ap-
proach that allows a closer examination of an agency decision than does
the arbitrariness standard.4 9 A third standard adopted by some courts
was de novo review, a strict standard by which the court construed
the relevant statutory terms5" and then applied them to the facts in the
case.
5 1
The arbitrary and capricious standard adopted by the Kleppe
Court has not been a clearly defined standard in environmental law
cases; even among courts that agreed that arbitrariness is the standard,
there was little agreement on the meaning of the term. Some courts
have looked at an agency's decision with closer scrutiny than an arbi-
trariness standard requires. In Hanly v. Kleindienst,52 for example, the
Second Circuit, having already required a "reviewable environmental
record, 53 also set forth procedural requirements for the threshold
determination 54 that, in the long run, might make the impact statement
itself the less arduous alternative.55
In determining whether an EIS is necessary, federal officials have
little guidance in the broad language of NEPA. The Act does not set
forth factors to be considered in making the determination, and courts
have reached no consensus as to what those factors should be. At least
one attempt to establish procedures to be followed and factors to be
considered has led to criticism that the threshold determination would
itself become a mini-impact statement.5 6 Due to the scale of federal
action potentially necessitating a programmatic EIS, the threshold
determination for a programmatic statement is not likely to be any easier
than for a project EIS. Furthermore, the programmatic statement is
designed to achieve something beyond that which is achieved by a sin-
gle project statement so that an agency's determination of the necessity
of a programmatic EIS should involve other considerations.
49. E.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973); Wyoming
Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
50. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
51. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356
(E.D.N.C. 1972).
52. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) (Hanly 1I).
53. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1972) (Hanly I).
54. 471 F.2d at 835.
55. See Anderson, supra note 48, at 358 for an analysis of Hanly H.
56. 471 F.2d at 837 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
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Prior to Kleppe, there had been a split of authority on the question
of the necessity of a programmatic impact statement.f 7 Even when a
program has been proposed by a federal agency, thereby meeting
SCRAP 11 requirements, the courts have failed to agree on the question
of requiring a programmatic EIS. The majority approach, derived
from a case involving one segment of a highway program, 58 has applied
an "independent utility" test. Generally, the independent utility test
mandates "so long as each major federal action is undertaken individu-
ally and not as an indivisible integral part of an integrated. . . system,
then the requirements of NEPA are determined on an individual major
federal action basis." 59  Cases applying the independent utility test 60
generally have involved highway projects, multi-phased dam systems or
reservoir systems.61 Rarely, however, in cases involving resource
development, have the courts required a comprehensive EIS. 2
57. While NEPA does not specifically mandate a detailed statement to cover geo-
graphically related major federal actions, various sections of the Act, when read together,
may be interpreted to require such statements. See note 5 supra. The Council on En-
vironmental Quality has issued guidelines stating that "[ilndividual actions that are re-
lated either geographically or as logical parts in a chain of contemplated actions may
be more appropriately evaluated in a single, program statement." Council on Environ-
mental Quality, Memorandum to Federal Agencies on Procedures for Improving Envi-
ronmental Impact Statements (May 16, 1972), quoted in Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info.,
Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Furthermore, the foremost author-
ity on NEPA has interpreted the Act as rejecting an incremental approach to planning
and as depending upon programmatic impact statements for its success. Anderson, supra
note 48, at 321.
58. Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11, 19 (8th Cir. 1973). The court
balanced the need for long-range planning and the advisability of considering long-range
environmental effects of a state highway system against the practical necessities of proj-
ect completion and concluded that the EIS must, at a minimum, cover the length of a
federally funded highway that is "supportable by logical termini at each end." Id.
59. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 356 F. Supp. 131, 139 (N.D.
Cal.), af!'d, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 41-6 U.S. 974 (1974).
60. The "independent utility" test was originally a standard used to determine min-
imum project size but was soon adopted as a measure of the need for a programmatic
EIS. One student author has criticized the latter application of the test, stating that,
as applied, it means: "[s]o long as a project has some independent justification, its role
as part of a larger program of interrelated, although not completely interdependent, units
is usually ignored." Comment, Planning Level and Program Impact Statements under
the National Environmental Policy Act: A Definitional Approach, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
124, 142 (1975).
61. See, e.g., Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975) (highway segment);
Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974) (two-phased dam system);
Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974) (system of reservoirs); Indian
Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973) (interstate highway projects);
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Sierra Club
v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974) (system of reservoirs); Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 356 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 974 (1973).
62. In one case, Minnesota PIRG v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973),
492 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
Generally, three approaches have been used in refusing to require pro-
grammatic statements in resource development cases:3 (1) an inde-
pendent utility test;64 (2) a test of interdependence so refined that a
programmatic EIS would be required only if the projects are essentially
indivisible;65 (3) a federal funding test, meaning that separate funding
of a project is interpreted as evidence showing independence. 0
While the Kleppe opinion did not refer to the independent
utility test or to any other test, the language used by the court may
be read to spell the demise of such tests, at least as sole determinants
of whether a programmatic statement is necessary.67  The test, it ap-
pears, for determining whether, in the absence of a federal program,
a programmatic impact statement is necessary, is whether the federal
agency can meet its duty under section 102(2)(C) to "assure considera-
tion of the environmental impact of their action in decisionmaking."' 8
The Supreme Court stated:
A comprehensive impact statement may be necessary in some cases
for an agency to meet this duty. Thus, when several proposals
for coal-related actions that will have cumulative or synergistic
environmental impact upon a region are pending concurrently be-
fore an agency, their environmental consequences must be consid-
a! 'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974), a federal district court did require a comprehensive
statement for a resource development plan. The United States Forest Service, pursuant
to a plan adopted prior to NEPA's effective date, was administering timber sales in the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA) of the Superior National Forest. A Minnesota
federal district court found that the cumulative effect of timber sales by the Forest Serv-
ice since NEPA's effective date constituted a major federal action requiring a program-
matic EIS.
After the BWCA EIS and Management Plan were published by the Forest Service,
plaintiffs filed another action claiming, inter alia, that the EIS and Management Plan
were procedurally and substantively inadequate under NEPA. The federal district court
agreed. Minnesota PIRG v. Butz, 401 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Minn. 1975). In 1976, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding the EIS prepared by the Forest Service
adequate for past actions in the BWCA. Citing Kleppe, the court of appeals, however,
did continue the injunction as to future timber sales since it found that the Forest Service
had not completed its plan for such sales and that, upon its completion a comprehensive
EIS would be necessary. 9 ENviR. REP. (BNA) 1220, 1232 (8th Cir. 1976). See note
86 infra. The distinction between this case and Kleppe is that here the Forest Service
did have a plan for further timber sales.
63. Comment, supra note 60, at 144-46.
64. Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974).
65. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
66. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub ioin.
Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
67. 96 S. Ct. at 2730.
68. Id. (quoting Conference Report on NEPA, 115 CONe. Rec. 40416 (1969)
(Senate)).
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ered together. Only through comprehensive consideration of pend-
ing proposals can the agency evaluate different courses of action.,9
While the Court would impose programmatic impact statements only
in narrow circumstances when there is not a federal program, the Court
appears aware of the value of such statements.
The value of programmatic impact statements has been attributed
to their practical contributions to the planning process. 70  A program-
matic EIS is especially helpful in providing information to analyze (1)
alternatives to individual major federal actions and (2) cumulative and
synergistic environmental effects of a number of federal projects.
Generally, the alternatives to a major federal action that must be con-
sidered are those "reasonably. related to the purpose of the project."7"
The question of the extent to which environmental consequences of alter-
natives to a given federal project must be considered was addressed
by Natural Resourses Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton (NRDC).71 In
NDRC, the District of Columbia Circuit held inadequate an EIS pre-
pared by the Department of the Interior on its proposed sale of offshore
leases because the EIS failed to consider the environmental conse-
quences of alternative courses of action, even though those alternatives
were available not to Interior, but to other federal agencies. Despite
the result, NRDC's contribution to the issue of alternatives considera-
tion has been attributed to its rule of reasonableness. The NRDC
court stated that "[i]n the last analysis, the requirement as to alterna-
tives is subject to a construction of reasonableness . . . . Where the
environmental aspects of alternatives are readily identifiable by the
"178agency, it is reasonable to state them ....
Another reason for programmatic impact statements is to provide
a clearer basis for understanding cumulative and synergistic impacts of
the various projects at a time that is meaningful for the decision pro-
cess. The Council on Environmental Quality has stated that the phrase
"major Federal actions" of NEPA section 102(2)(C)
69. Id. at 2730-31 (footnotes omitted).
70. The Council on Environmental Quality has issued guidelines stating the advan-
tages of a programmatic EIS: "it provides an occasion for a more exhaustive considera-
tion of effects and alternatives than would be practicable in a statement on an individual
action. It insures consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-
by-case analysis. And it avoids duplicative reconsideration of basic quality questions."
Council on Environmental Quality, Memorandum to Federal Agencies on Procedures for
Improving Environmental Impact Statements (May 16, 1972), quoted in Scientists' Inst.
for Pub. Info., Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1087-88 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
71. E.g., Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 1974).
72. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
73. Id. at 837.
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is to be construed by agencies with a view to the overall, cumulative
impact of the action proposed, related Federal actions and projects
in the area, and further actions contemplated. . . . [An environ-
mental statement should be prepared if it is reasonable to anticipate
a cumulatively significant impact on the environment from Federal
action. 74
Despite a vague realization by some courts that a programmatic EIS
will provide a better understanding of cumulative environmental
impacts and, thus, a better basis upon which to make decisions about
individual projects, 5 no case has dealt specifically with its planning
value insofar as cumulative impacts are concerned. A comprehensive
EIS allows the planner to select among alternative projects in a manner
that will maximize resource development while maintaining an "accep-
table" cumulative level of adverse environmental impacts. This result
is, of course, consistent with NEPA section 101(b)(3), 70 which makes
it the responsibility of federal agencies to "attain the widest range of
beneficial uses of the environment without degradation . . . ." In
many cases, a comprehensive EIS is necessary if the federal agency,
according to the NEPA mandate, is to "utilize a systematic ...
approach" 78 in making decisions affecting the human environment.
Under the Kleppe formulation, there are two possible situations
in which a programmatic statement will be required when there is in
fact no program. First, the federal agency itself may determine its
necessity. The Court seemed optimistic about this possibility, noting
that the Secretary had recently adopted an approach that would require,
in certain situations, the preparation of a single EIS instead of multiple
statements.7 9  The Court, however, overlooked the premise of NEPA
that environmental concerns are likely to be secondary'considerations
to agencies whose goals are nonenvironmental. 0 With a history of
emphasis on agency goals as opposed to agency planning processes,
agencies may be expected to skirt additional steps in order to
74. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1975), quoted in Note, Major Federal Actions under
the National Environmental Policy Act, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 580, 593-94 (1975).
75. See, e.g., Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975); Minnesota PIRG
v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973), afj'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (3) (1970).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 4332(2)(A).
79. 96 S. Ct. at 2731. To environmentalists this approach will still be insufficient
in some cases in which both a programmatic EIS and individual statements are necessary
for NEPA purposes. See, e.g., F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 122 (1973).
80. For a statement of that premise, see Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking
and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 515 (1974).
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achieve agency aims.A' Second, -the threshold decision of an adminis-
trator not to prepare a comprehensive EIS may be attacked as arbitrary
and capricious. This standard of judicial review is the most lenient of
the approaches used previously by federal courts; as applied by some
of the courts in EIS cases, however, the arbitrariness standard has re-
quired stricter procedures than in other cases."2 Perhaps some stricter
procedure will also be expected when courts review the threshold de-
cision in programmatic EIS cases.
The Kleppe opinion contains unclear signals to administrators on
the issue of factors that must be considered in determining whether
the programmatic statement is necessary. The Court suggested that
evaluation of "different courses of action" might prompt the need for
a programmatic statement; 3 the Court, however, did not discuss the
extent to which an agency must consider alternatives to a program, thus
appearing to leave NRDC 4 as the leading case on that question. The
Court also stated that "[c]umulative environmental impacts are, indeed,
what require a comprehensive impact statement."85 This flat assertion
and the Court's treatment of the timing issue in SCRAP II combined,
suggest that the Court did not understand the impact NEPA was in-
tended to have on the planning process. When a programmatic EIS
is considered for separate major federal actions already requiring indi-
vidual impact statements, each one of those separate projects, by defi-
nition, has an environmental impact and, consequently, a cumulative
impact. It is, therefore, difficult to understand what the Court meant
in its statement that such impacts necessitate a comprehensive EIS.88
The purpose of 'requiring a programmatic EIS is twofold: first, it pro-
vides an agency with sufficient information to evaluate the program
against alternative programs; second, it provides data by which indi-
vidual projects and combinations of projects within the program may
be evaluated against the other individual projects and combinations.
81. See generally Comment, supra note 60.
82. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
83. 96 S. Ct. at 2731.
84. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
85. 96 S. Ct. at 2732.
86. The Court in another place refers to "cumulative or synergistic" impact of mul-
tiple projects. 96 S. Ct. at 2730. See text accompanying note 69 supra. "Synergistic"
certainly makes more sense.
One federal court has already cited Kleppe as recognizing that a comprehensive
EIS will be necessary where proposed federal actions will have a cumulative or synergis-
tic impact upon an area. The court in that case further stated that the requirement for
a programmatic statement will depend upon the facts of each case. Minnesota PIRG
v. Butz, 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1220, 1232 (8th Cir. 1976).
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In the latter case, the ultimate plan will be a selection of the projects
that will maximize development while minimizing the cumulative ad-
verse environmental impacts. The Court's analysis of these factors-
alternatives and cumulative impacts-indicated a failure to understand
this twofold purpose.
Furthermore, any consideration of factors relevant to program-
matic statements is meaningless unless such considerations are made
at a time early enough for the choice of alternatives to be more than
an academic exercise. Natural resource planning and development re-
quire sophisticated and systematic assessments of, alternative resources,
alternative sources of the same resource, and, the environmental im-
pacts of all comparable resources and of all alternative sources. That
job as envisioned by the founders of NEPA was not intended to be
easy, but as supplies of resources have decreased, the job has become
more necessary; as information technology has increased, the job has
become more possible.
The analysis in Kleppe may have dealt a serious blow to the future
impact of NEPA. With a narrowly drawn exception87 programmatic
impact statements are not necessary unless there is a "recommendation
or report on proposals" for programs, a prerequisite that may be
avoided easily enough by federal officials whose primary goals are
often in conflict with environmental concerns. In the absence of a
program, there is the possibility, albeit remote, of showing that the
federal official acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to require
a programmatic EIS for projects pending at the same time.
The Court, therefore, has made an exception to SCRAP II by
requiring an EIS under certain circumstances even in the absence of
a proposed program. Although the Court successfully escaped the
literalism of that opinion, it fell into a different trap: it succumbed to
agency pressures and restricted the planning mandate of NEPA by
narrowly construing the necessity of a programmatic environmental
impact statement. Instead of imposing that restriction, the Court
should have begun the long and difficult formulation of standards that
will force agencies, before the fact, to develop comprehensive national
and regional plans and impact statements that will allow maximum
87. The exception is that when several project proposals having cumulative or syn-
ergistic impacts upon a region are pending concurrently before an agency a program-
matic EIS is necessary. In the absence of a federal program, therefore, programmatic
impact statements, according to the Court, do not cross regional boundaries and are con-
fined to projects pending at the same time and before the same agency.
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resource development with minimal environmental impacts. Long-
range planning is the mandate of NEPA that has been ignored because
of the initial high cost to governmental agencies in traditional terms of
agency output. In the long run, however, this command of NEPA
should provide the impetus for the most effective resource management
program possible.
ELIZABETH GORDON MCCRODDEN
Interstate Commerce-A Shipper's Remedy for Discrimination
Prohibited by the Motor Carrier Act
Section 216(d)I of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935' (Part II of the
Interstate Commerce Act) makes it unlawful for a regulated3 carrier
to subject a shipper "to any unjust discrimination."4 There have been
few cases in which the federal judiciary has been required to interpret
the nondiscrimination language contained in section 216(d) and thus
it has remained a relatively obscure provision of a major federal regula-
tory act. However, the recent decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.6
may signal the emergence of section 216(d) as an important weapon
in the legal arsenal of shippers. In this case of first impression,
the Fourth Circuit, relying exclusively on the reasoning of cases
interpreting a similar provisionr of the Federal Aviation Act of
1. 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1970).
2. Id. §§ 301-327.
3. Some motor carriers, including school busses, taxicabs and farm vehicles, are
excluded from the Act's coverage. Id. § 303(b).
4. Id. § 316(d). This section provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable
preference.or advantage to any particular person, port, gateway, locality, re-
gion, district, territory, or description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or
to subject any particular person, port, gateway, locality, region, district, terri-
tory, or description of traffic to any unjust discrimination or any undue or un-
reasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever ....
5.' See note 33 infra for a discussion of the cases that have interpreted section
216(d)'s prohibition of discriminatory conduct.
6. 540 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1976).
7. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970). This section provides:
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality,
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